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Abstract
 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
The effect of firm characteristics on the disclosure of IAS/IFRS information can not be studied in 
isolation of the national context of the country of nationality or domicile of the firm. Starting from 
the assumption that the intrinsic characteristics of the firm depend significantly on its size and the 
country of his nationality, we chose to work on companies belonging to different trading indices 
and from countries with different cultures and levels of economic development. The selected 
countries are Tunisia, France and Canada since Tunisia differs from Canada and France mainly by 
the level of economic development (developing countries) and France differs from Canada by 
culture. Our sample includes 52 Tunisian companies (40 listed on the first market and 12 on the 
alternative market), 244 French companies (35 CAC40 Index (top 40 French firms) and 209 
CACsmall (index of small Capitalization French firms)) and 223 Canadian companies (36 ^TX60 
(first 60 Canadian companies) and 187 ^TX20 Index (Small Capitalization Canadian firms)). Our 
results showed that the determinants of the disclosure of IAS/IFRS information will vary 
depending on the nationality of the firm and also showed the importance of the nationality of the 
firm in explaining disclosed information since the proxy used "country" has significant 
coefficients.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Companies with certain characteristics tend 
to disclose information even voluntary. Other 
companies are fighting against deliberate 
disclosure. Under mandatory disclosure situations, 
they seek the possibility to disclose the minimum 
information. 
The theory has shown that some 
mechanisms are behind the policy of disclosure or 
retention of information. As part of the agency 
theory, managers disclose information to minimize 
the costs of monitoring implemented by the 
shareholders. According to the same theory, 
indebted companies are motivated to disclose 
information to their creditors to show that they are 
trying to act in their interests. As part of the signal 
theory, any disclosure or withholding information 
is a signal to business partners and the public in 
general. 
Arguments have been advanced for the 
disclosure of information. They consider that it is 
beneficial since it will increase the value of the firm 
and reduce the cost of capital and cost of debt. In 
addition, the disclosure serves as a good signal for 
the performers and having a strong and healthy 
financial structure. Companies that do not publish 
information are penalized by high capital costs. 
The company is best placed to determine the 
nature of the information to produce and to 
increase the confidence of funders. The 
information must be produced to minimize the cost 
of capital and increase the company's value. 
Therefore, provide the information until the 
marginal cost equals the additional benefit. 
The cost of disclosed information is the 
production of information and the loss of 
competitive advantages. The benefits of disclosure 
beyond reducing the cost of capital may be 
reputation, good image, shareholder confidence 
and improving business and trade relations. The 
firms have the absolute will to protect and retain 
all relevant information to be opportunistically 
exploited by competitors. They attempt to disclose 
good information provided without containing 
sensitive information (Armitage and Marston, 
2008). 
Other arguments have been advanced 
against disclosure but for the retention of 
information. Thus, Hassan, Romilly, Giorgioni and 
Power (2009) showed that the effects of disclosure 
depend on three factors: uncertainty, multi-agent 
conflicts of interest and asymmetry of information. 
Given these factors, the authors predict a negative 
relationship between disclosure and the value of 
the firm. They give the example of public disclosure 
which can reduce the acquisition of private 
information by participants on the stock market 
and therefore the overall amount of information 
available on the market. Excessive public 
information places the firm at a competitive 
disadvantage compared to competing firms. 
Tadesse (2006) showed the existence of two 
categories of disclosure which are based on a 
disclosure transparency - stability and another 
based on transparency fragility. Transparency 
stability means that disclosure increases 
transparency and improves the information 
necessary for market discipline and greater 
efficiency in the allocation of resources where 
healthy firms are rewarded and the difficulties 
firms are penalized. Transparency-fragility 
supports the idea that disclosure creates negative 
externalities. 
We deduce from the results that the research 
reached, the determinants of disclosure does not 
necessarily promote transparency but reflect a 
policy and strategies set by firms in financial 
communication (La Bruslerie and Gabteni, 2014). 
The research showed the importance of the 
characteristics of the firm in the explanation of the 
disclosure. These characteristics are variables 
related to the size, debt, listing status, type of 
industry or sector of activity, listing abroad, 
internationalization, audit quality, performance, 
etc. 
However, the characteristics of the firm can’t 
alone determine the quantity and quality of 
information to be published since the accounting 
can not operate in isolation from its environment 
and context of the country in which it is adopted 
(Barbu, Dumontier, Feleagă and Feleagă, 2014). 
The objective of this work is to study the 
effect of the characteristics of the firm on the 
disclosure of IAS/IFRS information. The majority of 
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research has taken into account the specific 
characteristics of the firm such as size, 
performance or debt. Few studies have integrated 
the national context in the explanation of the 
disclosure of information. Our study takes into 
account, beside the intrinsic characteristics, the 
nationality of the firm that is usually the country of 
residence of the parent company. 
In what follows, we present the literature on 
the effect of specific and general characteristics of 
the firm on the disclosure of IAS/IFRS information 
and the hypotheses of the study (section 2), the 
research methodology (Section 3), the results 
(section 4) and finally the conclusion (section 5). 
 
Review of the literature and research hypotheses 
Characteristics like audit quality, size, degree 
of foreign participation in the capital positively 
impact the disclosure. However, the dominance of 
taxation, the lack of enforcement, corporate 
governance issues and the existence of inadequate 
management information systems are significant 
constraints to the successful adoption of IAS/IFRS 
(Mısırlıoğlu and Yükseltürk, 2013). 
The size measured by the natural logarithm 
of the number of employees, internationalization 
measured by the percentage of export sales and 
audit quality positively influence disclosure of 
items related to biological assets (IAS41), but the 
concentration of the property negatively affects the 
disclosure of such biological assets (Gonçalves 
Lopes, 2014). 
Firms with high liquidity ratio tend to 
disclose more information because it is a high ratio 
of good performance management indicator. In 
addition, performing firms disclose detailed 
information to increase investor confidence and 
strengthen their position (Al-Akra, Eddie and Ali, 
2010). 
Conflicting results have been found on 
multicotation. It has no effect on voluntary 
disclosure made by Spanish firms (Arcay and 
Vazquez, 2005) and has a significant and positive 
effect on the mandatory disclosure made by 
Zimbabwean firms (Ansah 1998). 
The profitability, the industry type, the IAS 
compliance, the listing status, the audit opinion and 
notes on methods and measurement bases provide 
a good indication of the level of disclosure (Street 
and Bryant, 2000). 
The disclosure of the items contained in the 
standards for non-current assets (IAS16, IAS36 and 
IAS38) is positively associated with the size (total 
assets), performance (return on assets) and audit 
quality (Coste, Tudor and Pali-Pista, 2014). 
Another measure of the size (total sales) has a 
significant effect on the mandatory disclosure 
practiced by Bangladeshi firms (Akhtaruddin, 
2005). 
The leverage, another characteristic of the 
firm next to the size has a significant effect on 
disclosure since the indebted firms seek to satisfy 
their lenders and reducing therefore the 
monitoring costs (Al-Akra, Eddie and Ali,  2010). 
All qualities related to audit such as the audit 
opinion, the auditor's reputation, the audit quality 
(Big4 or not), the specialization of the auditor and 
the duration of the audit relationship have been 
demonstrated variables promoting the quality of 
information disclosed (Elfouzi and Zaraï (2009) 
and Omri, Hakim and Baklouti (2009)). 
Under the political costs and a priori, the size 
has a positive effect on disclosure. Aljifri (2008) 
who worked on UAE companies listed on the stock 
exchanges of Abu Dhabi and Dubai and Adelopo 
(2011) who studied the voluntary disclosure 
practices adopted by listed companies on the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange of Lagos confirmed the 
hypothesis size. 
The theory of political visibility shows that 
large companies are looking to increase the trust of 
their partners and to advance a positive image 
about their activities and therefore they try to 
disclose much information. According to agency 
theory, information disclosure is used to reduce 
agency costs and reduce information asymmetry 
between the firm and the funders (Omar and 
Simon, 2011p. 170). 
Thus, we can formulate the hypothesis H1: 
the size of the firm has a positive effect on the 
disclosure of information. 
Profitable firms disclose the maximum 
information to show the public the profitability of 
their activities and therefore to possibly benefit 
from external funding. “According to agency 
theory, profitability 
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ratios reflect the performance of the company and 
therefore, managers could justify the continuation 
of their position and compensation arrangements. 
According to signaling theory, the idea that higher 
profitability ratios imply good news to the market 
and owners could avoid the undervaluation of their 
shares.” (Omar and Simon, 2011, p. 171) 
Thus, we can formulate the hypothesis H2: 
the performance of the firm has a positive effect on 
the disclosure of information. 
Indebted companies have interest in 
disclosing the information to show the public and 
particularly to their lenders they have managed the 
debt amount and all that with the aim to benefit 
from the renewal of the debt. 
Thus, we can formulate the hypothesis H3: 
the leverage has a positive effect on the disclosure 
of information. 
Firms listed on the first market increase 
disclosure of information to improve their ability 
to raise funds and reduce monitoring costs (Al-
Akra, Eddie and Ali, 2010). 
A listed company discloses information to 
increase its share on the stock market and benefit 
from advantageous financing since disclosure also 
has the effect to minimize the cost of capital. 
Moreover, the requirements of market regulation 
to disclose information are oriented more towards 
the firms listed as unlisted firms. 
Thus, we can formulate the hypothesis H4: 
the listing status has a positive effect on the 
disclosure of information. 
The audit opinion on the regularity and 
fairness of the financial statements reflects the 
quality of the information disclosed. An unqualified 
opinion shows that the information in the annual 
reports is good. If the auditor is unable to express 
an opinion or is obliged to express an adverse 
opinion, the information disclosed will be, in this 
case, poor quality. 
Thus, we can formulate the hypothesis H5: 
the audit opinion has an effect on the disclosure of 
information. 
A firm audited by a large audit firm (Big4) 
will suffer from increased visibility. The large audit 
firm has to show interest to stakeholders of the 
information that it is to work in accordance with 
professional standards and ethical rules to 
maintain its good reputation and quality of its 
services. Thus, the firm in question has no choice 
and must disclose more information as compared 
to unaudited companies by large audit firms. 
Thus, we can formulate the hypothesis H6: 
the audit quality has a positive effect on the 
disclosure of information. 
Liquidity high ratio firms tend to disclose 
more information because it is an indicator of good 
management performance. In addition, performing 
firms disclose detailed information to increase 
investor confidence and strengthen their market 
positions (Al-Akra, Eddie and Ali, 2010, p.175). 
Thus, we can formulate the hypothesis H7: 
the liquidity has a positive effect on the disclosure 
of information. 
The characteristics of the firm can not alone 
explain the disclosure of IAS/IFRS information 
because of traditions and existing reporting 
practices in the country of residence or nationality 
of the firm (Barbu, Dumontier, Feleagă and 
Feleagă, 2014). 
Thus, we can formulate the hypothesis H8: 
the country of nationality of the firm has an effect 
on the disclosure of information. 
 
METHODS 
 
A regression model by ordinary least square 
is applied which the dependent variable is the 
disclosure of the information, whether mandatory 
or voluntary or elementary (by accounting 
standard) and the independent variables are the 
size, leverage, liquidity, performance, listing status, 
audit quality, audit opinion and the country of 
domicile of the firm (generally, the nationality of 
the firm). 
The dependent variable is the disclosure of 
information. For each firm, we calculate a 
disclosure score. If the item is disclosed, we 
attribute the score 1 and if it is not disclosed, we 
attribute a score 0. The sum of the scores obtained 
by the firm represents the value of disclosure. 
After, we divide the sum of the scores by the sum of 
the applicable items. 
The regression model is presented as 
follows: 
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Disclosure of informationi = β0 + β1Sizei + 
β2Leveragei + β3Performancei + β4Liquidityi + 
β5Listing status + β6Audit qualityi + β7Audit 
opinioni + β8Tunisia + β9France + β10Canada + εi 
 
Table 1. Firm characteristics and the disclosure of information 
Variables Measures Predicted 
Sign 
Disclosure 
score 
p
i
p
I
1
Where Ii: item i that has 1 if it is disclosed, 0 otherwise, and p: 
the number of applicable items. 
 
Size Natural Logarithm of Total Assets (NLTA) + 
Leverage   Total Debt/Total Assets (TD/TA) - 
Performance Net Income/Total Assets (NI/TA) + 
Liquidity Current Assets/Current Liabilities (CA/CL) + 
Listing status 1 if the firm is listed in the indexi, 0 otherwise  
Audit quality 1 if the firm is audited by Big 4, 0 otherwise + 
Audit opinion 1 if the audit opinion is unqualified, 0 otherwise + 
Tunisia 1 if the firm is tunisian, 0 otherwise +/- 
France 1 if the firm is french, 0 otherwise +/- 
Canada 1 if the firm is canadian, 0 otherwise +/- 
 
To validate our hypotheses, we followed the 
following steps: 
- Identify the items contained in 
international standards; 
- Choose country and study samples; 
- Assess the level of disclosure by companies 
in annual reports; 
- Explain and interpret the disclosure of 
information by country; 
We have thoroughly analyzed the annual 
reports to identify the applicable items whose 
disclosure is mandatory and standard by standard 
inapplicable items and item by item. 
To evaluate the index of disclosure we have 
chosen to follow the following steps: 
1. read in depth the Tunisian accounting 
standards and international standards; 
2. highlight items whose disclosure is 
mandatory. The list of these items is largely under 
the title “Disclosures” in each standard; 
3. read carefully the annual reports and try 
to identify both the applicable and inapplicable 
items; 
4. count the number of applicable items and 
that of inapplicable items for each category of 
items; and 
5. calculate the extent of disclosure index for 
each category of items using the following formula: 
Total disclosed items/Total of the applicable items. 
For Tunisian companies and after reading 
the texts governing the Tunisian accounting system 
as well as the general standard and thematic 
standards, we have been able to identify and 
present the items whose disclosure is mandatory 
or voluntary for all companies. 
Table 2 summarizes the number of items 
whose disclosure is mandatory or voluntary for 
each Tunisian accounting standard. 
 
Table 2. Number of items of mandatory and voluntary disclosure by Tunisian accounting standards and 
number of consolidation items  
Standards Number Number of items 
Mandatory 
disclosure 
Voluntary 
disclosure 
Consolidation 
General Accounting Standard (Notes NC : 01 11 1  
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to Financial Statements) 
Equity NC : 02 11   
Revenues NC : 03 3   
Inventories NC : 04 4   
Tangible assets NC : 05 14   
Intangible assets  NC : 06 5   
Financial instruments NC : 07 4   
State income and extraordinary items 
(extraordinary items) 
NC : 08 2   
Construction Contracts NC : 09 3   
Deferred charges NC : 10 8   
Changes in accounting policies NC : 11 11   
Government Grants NC : 12 4   
Borrowing costs NC : 13 2   
Events after the balance sheet date NC : 14 10 1  
Transactions in foreign currencies NC : 15 4   
Expenditure on research and 
development 
NC : 20 5 3  
Consolidated Financial Statements NC : 35   6 
Investments in associates NC : 36   9 
Interests in joint ventures NC : 37   18 
Business Combinations NC : 38  1 22 
Related party transactions NC : 39 3   
Leases NC : 41 10   
Decree No. 96-2459 §83   4  
Total items  114 10 55 
 
For the French and Canadian companies, we 
referred to the international standard that has 
been adopted by most countries of the world. The 
calculation of the disclosure index is a difficult task 
that requires much time and accuracy in the 
presence of over 40 international accounting 
standards. 
“To identify and list the items subject of the 
study, we based on the texts of the standards 
adopted by the regulations of the Commission of 
European Communities, IFRS disclosure lists 
published by the two international firms KPMG and 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers” (Baazaoui, Sahnoun and 
Zaraï, 2015). 
Table 3 summarizes the number of items 
whose disclosure is mandatory or voluntary for 
each International Accounting Standard. 
 
Table 3. Number of items of voluntary and mandatory disclosure by IAS/IFRS 
Standards Number Number of items 
Mandatory 
disclosure 
Voluntary 
disclosure 
Presentation of Financial Statements IAS1 79 3 
Inventories IAS2 8  
Statement of Cash Flows IAS7 5 4 
Accounting Policies, Changes in Accounting Estimates 
and Errors 
IAS8 26  
Events after the Reporting Period IAS10 5  
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Construction Contracts IAS11 9  
Income Taxes IAS12 22 1 
Property, Plant and Equipment IAS16 22 4 
Leases IAS17 18  
Revenue IAS18 4  
Employee Benefits IAS19 43  
Accounting for Government Grants and Disclosure of 
Government Assistance 
IAS20 3  
The Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates IAS21 9  
Borrowing Costs IAS23 2  
Related Party Disclosures IAS24 21  
Earnings per Share IAS33 10  
Impairment of Assets IAS36 29 1 
Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent 
Assets 
IAS37 18  
Intangible Assets IAS38 13 2 
Investment Property  IAS40 26 2 
Agriculture  IAS41 35  
Share-based Payment IFRS2 11  
Business Combinations IFRS3 22  
Non-current Assets Held for Sale and Discontinued 
Operations 
IFRS5 11  
Exploration for and Evaluation of Mineral Resources IFRS6 2  
Financial Instruments: Disclosures IFRS7 115  
Operating Segments IFRS8 37  
Disclosure of Interests in Other Entities IFRS12 73  
Fair Value Measurement IFRS13 13  
Total items  691 17 
 
We chose to study the disclosure of 
information as laid down by international 
standards (IAS/IFRS) whether mandatory 
disclosure or voluntary disclosure in three 
countries, France (written law country), Canada 
(common law country) and Tunisia, which in 1997 
adopted an accounting system largely based on the 
international standards since there are no 
significant differences between the two Tunisian 
and international standards. 
Our study examined three samples Tunisian, 
French and Canadian detailed as follows: 
52 Tunisian companies, 40 of them listed on 
the main market and 12 listed on the alternative 
market, 35 companies listed on French CAC40 after 
excluding 4 financial institutions and a subsidiary 
of a non-French parent company, 209 companies 
listed on French CACsmall after excluding 4 
financial institutions, 2 investment companies, 1 
subsidiary of a Canadian parent and 9 companies 
presenting their accounts in a repository other 
than the IAS/IFRS, 36 Canadian companies listed 
on TSE60 after excluding 10 financial institutions, 
13 presenting their financial statements under US 
GAAP and a subsidiary of a non-Canadian parent 
and 187 Canadian companies listed on ^TSE20 
after excluding 7 financial institutions, 15 
investment companies and 14 companies 
presenting their financial statements according to 
USGAAP or Canadian GAAP. 
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Table 4. Samples of the study 
 Tunisian sample French sample Canadian 
sample 
Overall 
sample 
 Main 
market 
Alternative 
market 
CAC40 CACsmall TSE60 ^TSE20  
Initial sample 40 12 40 225 60 223 600 
Financial Institutions  -  4 4 10 7 25 
Investment companies    2  15 17 
Subsidiary of foreign 
parent 
  1 1 1  3 
Companies presenting their 
financial statements 
according to US GAAP or 
national GAAP 
   9 13 14 36 
Subtotal 40 12 35 209 36 187 519 
Total 52 244 223 519 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
We shall present the characteristics of 
disclosure indices by standard (dependent 
variables), the characteristics of quantitative and 
qualitative independent variables, the correlation 
matrix of independent variables and determinants 
of disclosure of IAS/IFRS information whether 
mandatory or voluntary or elementary (by 
accounting standard). 
 
Characteristics of disclosure indices 
Table 5 shows the characteristics of 
disclosure indices. The disclosure was quantified 
on a global scale either mandatory or voluntary 
and at the individual level by accounting standard 
for the three countries of the study.  
 
Table 5. Characteristics of disclosure indices by accounting standard 
Standard  
 
Tunisian sample French sample Canadian sample Overall sample 
(N) 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
(N) 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
(N) 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
(N) 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Mandatory 
disclosure 
(52) 
0.57 
0.11 (244) 
0.65 
0.96 (223) 
0.69 
0.08 (519) 
0.66 
0.66 
Voluntary 
disclosure  
(52) 
0.01 
0.06 (244) 
0.30 
0.15 (223) 
0.37 
0.16 (519) 
0.30 
0.18 
Ias1 (nc1)  (52) 
0.91 
0.17 (244) 
0.88 
0,03 (223) 
0.91 
0.02 (519) 
0.89 
0.06 
Ias2 (nc4)  (47) 
0.57 
0.17 (203) 
0.49 
0.11 (148) 
0.59 
0.14 (398) 
0.54 
0.14 
 Ias7 (nc8) (2)1 - (243) 
0.23 
0.25 (218) 
0.49 
0.39 (463) 
0.35 
0.35 
Ias8 (nc11) (4) 
0.81 
0.38 (76) 
0.60 
0.31 (44) 
0.70 
0.26 (124) 
0.65 
0.30 
 Ias10 
(nc14) 
(45) 
0.60 
0.30 (241) 
0.82 
0.25 (221) 
0.76 
0.21 (507) 
0.77 
0.25 
 Ias11 (nc9) 1 - (31) 
0.59 
0.23 (9) 
0.77 
0.14 (41) 
0.62 
0.24 
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Ias12 - - (241) 
0.56 
0.16 (222) 
0.73 
0.12 (463) 
0.64 
0.17 
Ias16 (nc5) (50) 
0.42 
0.15 (244) 
0.72 
0.09 (220) 
0.71 
0.07 (514) 
0.69 
0.12 
 Ias17 
(nc41) 
(11) 
0.24 
0.11 (173) 
0.31 
0.14 (113) 
0.35 
0.18 (297) 
0.32 
0.16 
 Ias18 (nc3) (52) 
0.57 
0.20 (242) 
0.55 
0.12 (218) 
0.59 
0.17 (512) 
0.57 
0.15 
 Ias19 - - (229) 
0.60 
0.16 (87) 
0.86 
0.19 (316) 
0.67 
0.20 
 Ias20 
(nc12) 
(14) 
0.48 
0.37 (113) 
0.50 
0.32 (48) 
0.42 
0.42 (175) 
0.47 
0.35 
 Ias21 
(nc15) 
(41) 
0.30 
0.28 (219) 
1 
0.04 (220) 
1 
0 (480) 
0.94 
0.21 
 Ias23 
(nc13) 
- - (62) 
0.30 
0.29 (61) 
0.72 
0.29 (125) 
0.51 
0.36 
 Ias24 
(nc39) 
(46) 
0.89 
0.31 (242) 
0.71 
0.19 (219) 
0.55 
0.30 (507) 
0.66 
0.28 
 Ias33 - - (243) 
0.77 
0.15 (219) 
0.77 
0.26 (462) 
0.77 
0.21 
Ias36  - - (244) 
0.63 
0.14 (219) 
0.47 
0.29 (463) 
0.56 
0.24 
Ias37 - - (242) 
0.50 
0.14 (222) 
0.50 
0.14 (464) 
0.50 
0.14 
Ias38 (nc6) (50) 
0.81 
0.28 (244) 
0.75 
0.09 (175) 
0.67 
0.09 (469) 
0.72 
0.13 
Ias40 - - (22) 
0.61 
0.24 (5) 
0.74 
0.07 (27) 
0.64 
0.22 
Ias41 - - (4) 
0.37 
0.41 (1) 1 - (5) 
0.50 
0.45 
Ifrs2 - - (164) 
0.66 
0.14 (215) 
0.77 
0.13 (379) 
0.72 
0.15 
Ifrs3 (nc38) (20)1 - (217) 
0.55 
0.14 (157) 
0.65 
0.18 (394) 
0.61 
0.18 
Ifrs5 - - (90) 
0.52 
0.18 (69) 
0.68 
0.22 (159) 
0.59 
0.22 
Ifrs6 - - (5) 
0.60 
0.22 (74) 
0.99 
0.12 (79) 
0.96 
0.16 
Ifrs7 (nc7) (50) 
0.51 
0.28 (244) 
0.74 
0.11 (223) 
0.80 
0.09 (517) 
0.74 
0.15 
Ifrs8 - - (204) 
0.64 
0.16 (157) 
0.58 
0.26 (361) 
0.61 
0.21 
Ifrs12 - - (229) 
0.56 
0.13 (168) 
0.46 
0.40 (397) 
0.52 
0.28 
Ifrs13 - - (241) 
0.24 
0.21 (223) 
0.35 
0.35 (464) 
0.29 
0.29 
nc2 (52) 0.29       
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0.67 
nc10 (32) 
0.61 
0.36       
 
 For most categories of disclosure, we note 
that Canadian companies’ disclosure scores are 
higher than those of French companies. The 
mandatory disclosure score largely reflects the 
compliance by companies with national 
regulations. The adoption of the international 
standard by France and Canada do not necessarily 
worth its implementation in these two countries. 
The voluntary disclosure score of Canadian 
companies (37%) is higher than that of French 
companies (30%). Just knowing that, the score of 
the voluntary disclosure was calculated on the 
basis of standards with items whose disclosure is 
optional. For example, disclosure of the entity's 
resources not recognized in the statement of 
financial position under IAS/IFRS (IAS1§13 and 
§14) is characteristic of Canadian firms and 
especially those operating in the oil sector or 
disclosure of the amounts of unrecognized 
deferred tax liabilities is usually the task of 
Canadian firms. However, the French and Canadian 
companies do not disclose voluntarily the 
aggregate amount of cash flows that represent 
enhancement in production capacity separately 
from those cash flows that are required to maintain 
this production capacity. In addition, they don’t 
disclose the book value of temporarily idle fixed 
assets or the gross carrying amount of any fully 
depreciated property and equipment that is still in 
use and the carrying value of fixed assets 
retirements and not classified as held for sale 
according to IFRS5 or when the cost model is used, 
the fair value of property when it differs 
significantly from the book value. 
  For thematic standards related to the 
financial market and the fair value (IAS19, IAS40, 
IFRS2, IFRS5, IFRS7, IFRS13), Canadian companies 
have high disclosure scores. By cons, for standards 
relating to regulatory and legal framework (IAS20, 
IAS 24, IAS37, IFRS8 and IFRS12), French 
companies have high disclosure scores. 
For Tunisia, the overall mandatory 
disclosure index is 57% which shows that almost 
half of the applicable items are disclosed by the 
companies studied. 
The list of voluntary information was 
determined from the conceptual framework 
(information on projected financial statements, 
human resources, environmental protection and 
technology), the general standard (distribution of 
expenses by destination (NC1)), NC14 
(contingencies positive impact), NC20 (research 
and development) and NC38 (positive effect of the 
business combination on the assumption of going 
concern). The items listed are not disclosed by the 
firms studied. Therefore, the disclosure index is 
almost zero. 
Since the Tunisian standards are strongly 
inspired by international standards financial 
accounting, firms were faced situations where 
there are items required by the technical standards 
for measurement, presentation and disclosure but 
these firms can not disclose because the items in 
question can not be applied due to their nature of 
operations performed, the sectors in which they 
operate and the total dichotomy between 
operations, events and circumstances affected by 
the items contained in the accounting standards 
and the reality of operations, events and 
circumstances experienced by firms. 
In this connection, we consider it necessary 
to analyze in depth the annual reports and identify 
therefore applicable items whose disclosure is 
mandatory and standard by standard inapplicable 
items and item by item. The high rates of disclosure 
of the items contained in the general standard 
(NC1), the standards for accounting changes 
(NC11) and related parties (NC39) are primarily 
due to the low number of items (11 (NC1), 11 
(NC11) and 03 (NC39)). 
The high extent of disclosure index (81%) of 
the items contained in the standard for intangible 
assets (NC6) does not reflect the actual disclosure 
of the items but the existence of a high number of 
inapplicable items (almost 7 items inapplicable 
over 10 items). These items relate to intangible 
assets under development, improvement as well as 
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spending on research and development. This type 
of operation is almost absent in the sample firms. 
24 companies publishing consolidated 
financial statements, disclose most items under the 
standards for consolidation (NC35, NC36, NC37 
and NC38). All surveyed companies publish the 
scope of consolidation, consolidation methods 
adopted (full consolidation, proportionate 
consolidation or the equity method) and the 
process continued in the preparation and 
presentation of consolidated financial statements. 
 
Characteristics of the explanatory variables 
Table 6 shows the characteristics of 
quantitative variables. 
 
Table 6. Characteristics of quantitative variables 
 Tunisian 
sample 
French 
sample 
Canadian 
sample 
Overall 
sample 
Natural Logarithm of Total 
Assets 
    
Minimum 16.21 15.09 16.66 15.09 
Maximum 21.13 26.27 25.08 26.27 
Mean 18.19 19.71 20.73 20.00 
Standard deviation 1.10 2.32 1.49 2.05 
Net Income/Total Assets     
Minimum -0.20 -9.94 -1.08 -9.94 
Maximum 0.27 0.42 6.20 6.20 
Mean 0.04 -0.06 0.02 -0.02 
Standard deviation 0.10 0.65 0.45 0.54 
Total Liabilities/Total Assets     
Minimum 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 
Maximum 2.65 10.66 1.79 10.66 
Mean 0.52 0.62 0.47 0.54 
Standard deviation 0.39 0.68 0.24 0.51 
Current Assets/Current 
Liabilities 
    
Minimum 0.33 0.03 0.05 0.03 
Maximum 58.20 35.38 159.1 159.1 
Mean 3.65 1.75 3.14 2.54 
Standard deviation 8.84 2.39 11.06 7.96 
 
The natural logarithm of total assets of 
Canadian firms is on average higher than for 
French companies. Canadian companies are more 
profitable, more liquid and less leveraged than 
French companies. Tunisian companies have the 
lowest natural logarithm of total assets and are 
more profitable and more liquid than Canadian and 
French companies. However, all values of the 
quantitative variables are more dispersed with 
respect to the average (all the standard deviations 
are high). Table 7 shows the characteristics of 
qualitative variables. 
 
Table 7. Characteristics of qualitative variables 
 Tunisian sample French sample Canadian sample Overall sample 
Listing status(1)     
Index1 40 (77%) 35 (14%)  36 (16%) 111 (0.21) 
Index0 12 (23%) 209 (86%) 187 (84%) 408 (0.79) 
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Total 52 (100%) 244 (100%) 223 (100%)  519 (100%) 
Audit opinion     
Unqualified opinion  36 (69%) 236 (97%) 223 (100%) 495 (0.95) 
Qualified opinion  16 (31%) 8 (3%) 0 (0%) 24 (0.05) 
Total 52 (100%) 244 (100%) 223 (100%) 519 (100%) 
Audit Quality     
 Big4 13 (25%) 185 (76%) 213 (96%) 411 (0.79) 
 Non Big4 39 (75%) 59 (24%) 10 (4%) 108 (0.21) 
Total 52 244 223 (100%) 519 (100%) 
(1): index1: main market (Tunisia), CAC40 (France) and TSE60 (Canada) and index0: Alternative Market 
(Tunisia), CACsmall (France) and ^ TSE20 (Canada). 
 
Companies listed on index1 are 111 in 
number representing 21 % of the overall sample. 
495 unqualified audit opinions are issued 
representing 95% of the studied annual reports. 
Other audit opinions are qualified. There is no 
adverse opinion or certification denial that is to 
say, unable to express an opinion. For Canadian 
companies, all opinions are unqualified (outright) 
and are audited by the Big4 majority (96%). The 
majority of Tunisian companies are audited by non 
Big4 (75%). 
 
Correlations  
Table 8. Correlations matrix 
 NLTA TD/TA NI/TA CA/CL Listing 
status 
Audit 
quality 
Audit 
opinion 
Tunisia France Canada 
Tunisian 
sample 
          
NLTA 1          
TD/TA 0.09 1         
NI/TA 0.04 -0.45 1        
CA/CL 0.20 -0.34 0.12 1       
Listing 
status 
0.30 -0.04 0.32 -0.04 1      
Audit 
quality 
0.28 0.25 0.03 0.15 0.00 1     
Audit 
opinion 
-0.09 -0.18 0.38 0.16 0.43 0.10 1    
French 
sample 
          
NLTA  1          
TD/TA -0.07 1         
NI/TA  0.21 -0.93 1        
CA/CL -0.10 -0.17  0.06 1       
Listing 
status 
 0.79  0.01  0.06 -0.09 1      
Audit 
quality 
 0.23  0.05 -0.06 -0.12  0.23 1     
Audit 
opinion 
 0.14 -0.05  0.02  0.05  0.08  0.06 1    
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Canadian 
sample 
          
NLTA  1          
TD/TA  0.25 1         
NI/TA -0.02 -0.09 1        
CA/CL -0.15 -0.25  0.17 1       
Listing 
status 
 0.81  0.08  0.01 -0.06 1      
Audit 
quality 
 0.12 -0.01  0.01  0.01  0.10 1     
Audit 
opinion 
    na        na        na       na        na  na na    
Overall 
sample 
          
NLTA 1          
TD/TA -0.04  1         
NI/TA 0.14 -0.74 1        
CA/CL -0.06 -0.14  0.11 1       
Listing 
status 
0.47  0.01  0.06 -0.02 1      
Audit 
quality 
0.35  0.02 -0.03  0.00 -0.08 1     
Audit 
Opinion  
0.19 -0.06  0.02  0.03 -0.06  0.25 1    
Tunisia -0.30 -0.01  0.03  0.05  0.45 -0.45 -0.42  1   
France -0.13  0.14 -0.08 -0.09 -0.16 -0.08  0.06 -0.31  1  
Canada 0.31 -0.13  0.06  0.07 -0.11  0.35  0.19 -0.29 -0.82 1 
 
For Tunisia, the size measured by the natural 
logarithm of total assets is correlated to the listing 
status and audit quality. Leverage as measured by 
total debt divided by total assets (TD/TA) is 
correlated with the audit opinion and the 
performance measured by the ratio between net 
income and total assets (NI/TA). The listing status 
is correlated to the audit opinion. 
For France, the size (NLTA) is strongly 
correlated to the listing status. It is the same for 
leverage (TD/TA) and liquidity measured by the 
ratio of current assets to current liabilities 
(CA/CL). The audit quality and listing status are 
correlated because the majority of large companies 
are audited by Big4. 
For Canada, the size is strongly correlated to 
the listing status and leverage is negatively related 
to liquidity. All opinions expressed are unqualified. 
They are therefore a single value (1). 
For the overall sample, the size is positively 
correlated to the listing status and the country 
"Canada" is negatively correlated to the country 
"Tunisia" since large companies are listed on 
index1 (main market for Tunisia, CAC40 for France 
and TSE60 for Canada) and Canadian firms have a 
higher size than firms in other countries. The 
leverage is negatively related to the liquidity. The 
listing status is correlated to the country "Tunisia" 
because 77% of Tunisian companies are listed on 
the main market unlike companies in other 
countries. The audit quality and the audit opinion 
are negatively correlated to the country "Tunisia" 
since 75% of Tunisian companies are audited by 
non Big4 and 31% of them has been expressed at 
their subjects a qualified opinion unlike their 
French and Canadian counterparts. The country 
"France" and the country "Canada" are highly 
correlated but in opposite sign because companies 
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in these two countries have similar values of the 
variables studied. 
 
Determinants of the disclosure of IAS/IFRS 
information 
Table 9 shows the results for the 4 sample 
categories regression models. 
 
Table 9. Determinants of disclosure of IAS/IFRS information 
Dependent 
variable 
Independent Variables  
 Tunisia France Canada Overall sample 
Mandatory 
disclosure 
Nobs: 
Tunisia: 52 
France: 244 
Canada: 
223 
Total: 519 
NLTA : t = 0.04 (0.02),  
TD/TA : t = -0.08 (0.01), 
CA/CL : t=-0.00 (0.08),  
Na* : t=0.46 (0.01), 
Status : t = -0.06 (0.18) 
Quality : t = 0.05 (0.16) 
Opinion: t =-0.04 (0.16) 
(R2 = 0.30, ajusted R2 = 
0.17, prob(F) = 0.02) 
- NLTA: t=0.03 
(0.00) 
TD/TA : t=0.03 
(0.16) 
NI/TA: t=0.01 
(0.17) 
Quality:t=-0.02 
(0.40) 
CA/CL : t=0.00 
(0.02) 
(R2 = 0.27, ajusted 
R2 = 0.25, prob(F) 
= 0.00)  
- 
Voluntary 
disclosure 
Nobs: 
Tunisia: 52 
France: 244 
Canada: 
223 
Total: 519 
NLTA : t = 0.04 (0.02),  
TD/TA : t = -0.08 (0.01), 
CA/CL : t=-0.00 (0.08),  
Na* : t=0.46 (0.01), 
Status : t = -0.06 (0.18) 
Quality : t = 0.05 (0.16) 
Opinion: t =-0.04 (0.16) 
(R2 = 0.30, adjusted R2 = 
0.17, prob(F) = 0.02) 
Status : t=0.08 
(0.00) 
(R2=0.04, 
adjusted R2 = 0.03 
prob(F)=0.00) 
Status : t=0.25 
(0.00) 
TD/TA : t=0.03 
(0.38) 
NI/TA : t=0.01 
(0.49) 
CA/CL : t=-0.00 
(0.58) 
Quality : t=-0.04 
(0.38) 
(R2 = 0.34, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.32, prob(F) = 
0.00) 
Nlta : t=0.02 
(0.00) 
Quality : t=-0.00 
(0.85) 
France : t=0.25 
(0.00) or 
Canada : t=0.30 
(0.00) 
(R2 = 0.39, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.38, prob(F) = 
0.00) 
ias1 (nc1) 
Nobs: 
Tunisia: 52 
France: 244 
Canada: 
223 
Total: 519 
Quality : 0.09 (0.09), (R2 = 
0.06, adjusted R2 = 0.04, 
prob(F) = 0.09) 
Status : t=-0.01 
(0.02) 
Quality : t=-0.00 
(0.96) 
TD/TA : t=0.00 
(0.61) 
(R2 = 0.03, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.01, prob(F) = 
0.10) 
Status : t=0.01 
(0.01) 
TD/TA : t=0.01 
(0.03) 
NI/TA : t=-0.01 
(0.08) 
CA/CL : t=-0 
(0.18) 
Quality : t=-0 
(0.53) 
(R2 = 0.09, 
adjusted R2 = 
France : t=-0.03 
(0.00) or 
Canada : t=-0.00 
(0.00) 
(R2 = 0.07, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.07, prob(F) = 
0.00) 
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0.07, prob(F) = 
0.00) 
nc2 
Nobs: 
Tunisia: 52 
France: - 
Canada: - 
Total: 52 
Status: t=0.27 (0.01) 
Quality: t=0.15 (0.09) 
Opinion: t=-0.14 (0.14) 
CA/CL: t=-0.01 (0.15) 
(R2 = 0.21, adjusted R2 = 
0.15, prob(F) = 0.02) 
- - - 
ias2 (nc4) 
Nobs: 
Tunisia: 47 
France: 203 
Canada: 
148 
Total: 398 
NLTA : t=0.04 (0.09) 
Internationalization* : 
t=0.09 (0.07) 
 (R2 = 0.13, adjusted R2 = 
0.09, prob(F) = 0.05) 
NLTA : t=0.02 
(0.00) 
Quality : t=0.03 
(0.09) 
NI/TA : t=0.00 
(0.81) 
CA/CL : t=-0.00 
(0.83) 
(R2 = 0.15, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.13, prob(F) = 
0.00) 
Status : t=0.17 
(0.00) 
TD/TA : t=-0.05 
(0.36) 
NI/TA : t=-0.14 
(0.36) 
CA/CL : t=0.01 
(0.19) 
Quality : t=0.08 
(0.12) 
(R2 = 0.33, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.31, prob(F) = 
0.00) 
Status : t=0.11 
(0.00) 
Quality : t=0.04 
(0.02) 
France : t=-0.05 
(0.05) or 
Canada : t=0.05 
(0.07) 
(R2 = 0.27, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.26, prob(F) = 
0.00) 
ias7 (nc8) 
Nobs: 
Tunisia: 2 
France: 243 
Canada: 
218 
Total: 463 
- NLTA : t=0.04 
(0.00) 
(R2 = 0.13, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.13, prob(F) = 
0.00) 
NLTA : t=0.02 
(0.35) 
TD/TA: t=0.03 
(0.79) 
NI/TA : t=0.09 
(0.14) 
CA/CL : t=-0.00 
(0.27) 
(R2 = 0.04, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.02, prob(F) = 
0.12) 
NLTA : 0.03 (0.00) 
France : -0.80 
(0.00) or 
Canada : -0.57 
(0.01) 
(R2 = 0.19, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.18, prob(F) = 
0.00) 
ias8 (nc11) 
Nobs: 
Tunisia: 4 
France: 76 
Canada: 44 
Total: 124 
- Status : t=-0.30 
(0.00) 
TD/TA : t=0.5 
(0.00) 
Opinion : t=0.62 
(0.00) 
(R2 = 0.30, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.27, prob(F) = 
0.00) 
NLTA : t=-0.08 
(0.00) 
TD/TA : t=0.07 
(0.76) 
NI/TA : t=-0.34 
(0.32) 
CA/CL : t=-0.01 
(0.78) 
Quality : t=2.4 
(0.00) 
(R2 = 0.28, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.21, prob(F) = 
0.01) 
Status : -0.28 
(0.00) 
France : -0.29 
(0.03) or 
Canada : -0.13 
(0.35) 
(R2 = 0.25, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.23, prob(F) = 
0.00) 
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Nc10 
Nobs: 
Tunisia: 32 
France: - 
Canada: - 
Total: 32 
NLTA : t=0.18 (0.00) 
Status : t=-0.47 (0.02) 
Opinion : t=0.36 (0.08) 
Internationalization* : 
t=0.30 (0.02) 
 (R2 = 0.40, adjusted R2 = 
0.31, prob(F) = 0.02) 
 - - 
ias10 
(nc14) 
Nobs: 
Tunisia: 45 
France: 241 
Canada: 
221 
Total: 507 
NLTA: t=0.07 (0.16) 
Status : t=-0.35 (0.01) 
NCL/TE*: t=-0.16 (0.07) 
(R2 = 0.17, adjusted R2 = 
0.11, prob(F)=0.05) 
Status : t=-0.54 
(0.00) 
Opinion : t=-0.05 
(0.37) 
(R2 = 0.61, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.60, prob(F) = 
0.00) 
Status : t=-0.3 
(0.00) 
TD/TA : t=0.05 
(0.30) 
NI/TA : t=0.01 
(0.75) 
CA/CL : t=0.00 
(0.1) 
Quality : t=-0.12 
(0.04) 
(R2 = 0.30, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.28, prob(F) = 
0.00) 
Status : -0.41 
(0.00) 
Tunisia : 0.12 
(0.00) 
France : 0.06 
(0.00) 
(R2 = 0.42, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.42, prob(F) = 
0.00) 
ias11 (nc9) 
Nobs: 
Tunisia: 1 
France: 31 
Canada: 09 
Total: 41 
- TD/TA: t=0.41 
(0.20) 
CA/CL : t=0.19 
(0.05) 
NLTA : t=0.03 
(0.13) 
Quality : t=-0.18 
(0.27) 
(R2 = 0.31, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.21, prob(F) = 
0.04) 
Status : t=0.07 
(0.36) 
TD/TA : t=0.59 
(0.05) 
CA/CL : t=0.12 
(0.13) 
(R2 = 0.26, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.18, prob(F) = 
0.04) 
Nlta : 0.02 (0.18) 
TD/TA : 0.57 
(0.01) 
CA/CL : 0.12 
(0.07) 
Quality : -0.15 
(0.32) 
Tunisia : -0.83 
(0.00) 
France : -0.23 
(0.01) or Canada : 
0.23 (0.01) 
R2 = 0.48, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.39, prob(F) = 
0.00) 
ias12 
Nobs: 
Tunisia: - 
France: 241 
Canada: 
222 
Total: 463 
- Status : t=0.27 
(0.00) 
Quality : t=0.02 
(0.31) 
(R2 = 0.36, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.35, prob(F) = 
0.00) 
status : t=0.24 
(0.00) 
TD/TA : t=0.01 
(0.58) 
NI/TA : t=0.00 
(0.91) 
CA/CL : t=-0.00 
(0.29) 
Quality : t=-0.00 
(0.96) 
(R2 = 0.57, 
Status: 0.25 (0.00) 
Quality : 0.02 
(0.20) 
Opinion : -0.01 
(0.72) 
France : -0.17 
(0.00) or Canada : 
0.17 (0.00) 
(R2 = 0.58, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.57, prob(F) = 
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adjusted R2 = 
0.56, prob(F) = 
0.00) 
0.00) 
ias16 (nc5) 
Nobs: 
Tunisia: 50 
France: 244 
Canada: 
220 
Total: 514 
NLTA : t=0.07 (0.01) 
Status : t=-0.13 (0.04) 
Opinion : t=-0.07 (0.19) 
NCL/TE* : t=-0.09 (0.04) 
 (R2 = 0.16, adjusted R2 = 
0.16, prob(F) = 0.09) 
Status : t=-0.11 
(0.00) 
TD/TA : t=0.01 
(0.40) 
CA/CL : t=-0.00 
(0.21) 
(R2 = 0.20, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.19, prob(F) = 
0.00) 
- 
 
Status : -0.06 
(0.00) 
Quality : -0.01 
(0.39) 
Opinion : 0.02 
(0.26) 
Tunisia : -0.25 
(0.00) 
France : 0.01 
(0.18) 
(R2 = 0.53, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.53, 
prob(F)=0.00) 
ias17 
(nc41) 
Nobs: 
Tunisia: 11 
France: 173 
Canada: 
113 
Total: 297 
- NLTA : t=0.01 
(0.00) 
Quality : t=0.03 
(0.24) 
Opinion : t=0.07 
(0.41) 
(R2 = 0.07, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.06, prob(F) = 
0.00) 
Status : t=0.05 
(0.16) 
TD/TA: t=-0.17 
(0.04) 
NI/TA : -0.01 
(0.80) 
CA/CL : t=0.00 
(0.87) 
Quality : t=-0.20 
(0.03)  
(R2 = 0.12, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.07, 
prob(F)=0.02) 
NLTA : 0.01 (0.00) 
CA/CL : -0.00 
(0.21) 
Tunisia : -0.06 
(0.22) 
France : -0.03 
(0.09) 
(R2 = 0.07, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.05, prob(F) = 
0.00) 
ias18 (nc3) 
Nobs: 
Tunisia: 52 
France: 242 
Canada: 
218 
Total: 512 
Tsales*: t=2.79 10-10 
(0.05) 
Status : t=0.09 (0.19) 
Quality : t=-0.08 (0.18) 
Opinion : t=-0.14 (0.02) 
 (R2 = 0.23, adjusted R2 = 
0.16, prob(F) = 0.02) 
Status : t=0.18 
(0.00) 
Opinion : t=0.02 
(0.54) 
(R2 = 0.29, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.29, prob(F) = 
0.00) 
 
Status : t=0.4 
(0.00) 
TD/TA : t=-0.02 
(0.41) 
NI/TA : 0.06 
(0.00) 
CA/CL : t=0.00 
(0.61) 
Quality : t=-0.00 
(0.92)  
(R2 = 0.75, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.74, prob(F) = 
0.00) 
Status : 0.26 
(0.00) 
France : 0.15 
(0.00) 
Canada : 0.18 
(0.00) 
NI/TA : 0.02 
(0.07) 
(R2 = 0.40, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.40, prob(F) = 
0.00) 
ias19 
Nobs: 
Tunisia: - 
- NLTA : 0.02 (0.00) 
NI/TA : 0.09 
(0.16) 
- NLTA : 0.02 (0.00) 
NI/TA : 0.06 
(0.35) 
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France: 229 
Canada: 87 
Total: 316 
Quality : 0.07 
(0.01) 
Opinion : 0.01 
(0.80) 
(R2 = 0.19, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.18, prob(F) = 
0.00) 
Quality : 0.06 
(0.02) 
Opinion : 0.02 
(0.75) 
France : -0.20 
(0.00) 
(R2 = 0.40, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.39, prob(F) = 
0.00) 
 
ias20 
(nc12) 
Nobs: 
Tunisia: 14 
France: 113 
Canada: 48 
Total: 175 
- NLTA : -0.04 
(0.00) 
NI/TA : -0.37 
(0.02) 
CA/CL : 0.05 
(0.08) 
Opinion : -0.08 
(0.64) 
(R2 = 0.38, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.36, prob(F) = 
0.00) 
Status : t=-0.57 
(0.00) 
TD/TA : t=0.39 
(0.20) 
NI/TA : t=-0.83 
(0.17) 
CA/CL: t=01 
(0.69) 
Quality : t=-0.15 
(0.67) 
(R2 = 0.48, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.42, prob(F) = 
0.00) 
Status : -0.32 
(0.00) 
NI/TA: -0.33 
(0.03) 
CA/CL : 0.03 
(0.09) 
France : -0.13 
(0.14) or 
Canada : -0.08 
(0.37) 
(R2 = 0.29, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.27, prob(F) = 
0.00) 
ias21 
(nc15) 
Nobs: 
Tunisia: 41 
France: 219 
Canada: 
220 
Total: 480 
Quality : -0.12 (0.20) 
Opinion : -0.16 (0.09) 
(R2 = 0.12, adjusted R2 = 
0.07, prob(F) = 0.09) 
Status : -0.02 
(0.01) 
Opinion : -0.00 
(0.93) 
(R2 = 0.03, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.02, prob(F) = 
0.03) 
- Status : 0.00 
(0.76) 
Quality : -0.02 
(0.06) 
Opinion : -0.09 
(0.00) 
Tunisia : -0.74 
(0.00) 
France : -0.01 
(0.17) 
(R2 = 0.85, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.85, prob(F) = 
0.00) 
ias23 
(nc13) 
Nobs: 
Tunisia: 2 
France: 62 
Canada: 61 
Total: 125 
- - - NLTA : 0.03 (0.04) 
TD/TA : -0.04 
(0.79) 
NI/TA : 0.20 
(0.43) 
CA/CL : -0.00 
(0.82) 
Quality : -0.18 
(0.16) 
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France : -0.43 
(0.00) 
(R2 = 0.38, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.35, prob(F) = 
0.00) 
ias24 
(nc39) 
Nobs: 
Tunisia: 46 
France: 242 
Canada: 
219 
Total: 507 
- NLTA : 0.01 (0.01) 
Opinion : 0.20 
(0.00) 
TD/TA : 0.02 
(0.30) 
(R2 = 0.07, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.06, prob(F) = 
0.00) 
Status : t=0.27 
(0.00) 
TD/TA : t=0.13 
(0.12) 
NI/TA : t=-0.04 
(0.32) 
CA/CL : t=0 
(0.03) 
Quality : t=0.02 
(0.79) 
(R2 = 0.14, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.12, prob(F) = 
0.00) 
Status : 0.13 
(0.00) 
Quality: 0.04 
(0.20) 
Opinion : 0.01 
(0.84) 
Tunisia : 0.12 
(0.02) 
Canada : -0.17 
(0.00) or France : 
0.17 (0.00) et  
(R2 = 0.18, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.18, prob(F) = 
0.00) 
 ias33 
Nobs: 
Tunisia: - 
France: 243 
Canada: 
219 
Total: 462 
- Status : -0.09 
(0.00) 
NI/TA : -0.01 
(0.47) 
(R2 = 0.05, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.04, prob(F) = 
0.00) 
- Status : -0.08 
(0.00) 
CA/CL : 0.00 
(0.32) 
TD/TA : 0.02 
(0.35) 
(R2 = 0.02, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.02, prob(F) = 
0.02) 
ias36 
Nobs: 
Tunisia: - 
France: 244 
Canada: 
219 
Total: 463 
- NLTA : 0.01 (0.07) 
Quality : 0.04 
(0.05) 
(R2 = 0.04, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.03, prob(F) = 
0.01) 
Status : t=0.41 
(0.00) 
TD/TA : t=0.06 
(0.38) 
NI/TA : t=-0.04 
(0.32) 
CA/CL : t=-0 
(0.10) 
Quality : t=0.02 
(0.84) 
(R2 = 0.29, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.28, prob(F) = 
0.00) 
Status : 0.21 
(0.00) 
CA/CL : -0.00 
(0.01) 
France : 0.16 
(0.00) 
(R2 = 0.23, 
adjusted R2 = 0.2 
3, prob(F) = 0.00) 
ias37 
Nobs: 
Tunisia: - 
- Status : 0.13 
(0.00) 
NI/TA : 0.01 
Status : t=0.24 
(0.00) 
TD/TA : t=0.05 
Status : 0.19 
(0.00) 
NI/TA : 0.01 
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France: 242 
Canada: 
222 
Total: 464 
(0.59) 
Opinion : -0.07 
(0.15) 
(R2 = 0.10, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.09, prob(F) = 
0.00) 
(0.14) 
NI/TA : t=-0.02 
(0.19) 
CA/CL : t=-0 
(0.83) 
Quality : t=-0.04 
(0.27) 
(R2 = 0.41, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.40, prob(F) = 
0.00) 
(0.35) 
Opinion : -0.07 
(0.11) 
Quality : -0.02 
(0.17) 
(R2 = 0.23, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.22, prob(F) = 
0.00) 
ias38 (nc6) 
Nobs: 
Tunisia: 50 
France: 244 
Canada: 
175 
Total: 469 
Status: t=0.13 (0.17) 
Quality : t=-0.15 (0.09) 
Opinion : t=-0.25 (0.01) 
 (R2 = 0.17, adjusted R2 = 
0.11, prob(F) = 0.04) 
- Status : t=0.12 
(0.00) 
TD/TA : t=0.03 
(0.31) 
NI/TA : t=-0.04 
(0.38) 
CA/CL : t=0 
(0.66) 
(R2 = 0.32, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.30, prob(F) = 
0.00) 
Status : 0.06 
(0.00) 
Quality : 0.02 
(0.15) 
Opinion : -0.12 
(0.00) 
Tunisia : 0.00 
(0.84) or 
Canada : -0.08 
(0.00) 
(R2 = 0.18, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.17, prob(F) = 
0.00) 
ias40 
Nobs: 
Tunisia: - 
France: 22 
Canada: 5 
Total: 27 
- - - - 
ias41 
Nobs: 
Tunisia: - 
France: 4 
Canada: 1 
Total: 5 
- - - - 
ifrs2 
Nobs: 
Tunisia: - 
France: 164 
Canada: 
215 
Total: 379 
- NLTA : -0.01 
(0.00) 
Opinion : 0.08 
(0.35) 
(R2 = 0.06, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.05, prob(F) = 
0.00) 
Status : t=-0.17 
(0.00) 
TD/TA : t=0.01 
(0.82) 
NI/TA : t=-0.00 
(0.98) 
CA/CL : t=4.01 10-
5 (0.96) 
Quality : t=0.05 
(0.21) 
(R2 = 0.23, 
Status : -0.13 
(0.00) 
Quality : 0.05 
(0.03) 
Opinion : 0.09 
(0.21) 
CA/CL : 6.25 10-5 
(0.93) 
Canada : 0.09 
(0.00) 
(R2 = 0.25, 
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adjusted R2 = 
0.21, prob(F) = 
0.00) 
adjusted R2 = 
0.24, prob(F) = 
0.00) 
ifrs3 (nc38) 
Nobs: 
Tunisia: 20 
France: 217 
Canada: 
157 
Total: 394 
- NLTA : 0.03 (0.00) 
Quality : 0.03 
(0.16) 
(R2 = 0.23, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.22, prob(F) = 
0.00) 
Status : t=0.32 
(0.00) 
TD/TA : t=0.06 
(0.23) 
NI/TA : t=-0.11 
(0.35) 
CA/CL : t=-0 
(0.75) 
Quality : t=-0.02 
(0.67) 
(R2 = 0.55, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.54, prob(F) = 
0.00) 
Status : 0.25 
(0.00) 
Opinion : -0.02 
(0.64) 
Tunisia : 0.24 
(0.00) 
Canada : 0.09 
(0.00) 
(R2 = 0.57, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.56, prob(F) = 
0.00) 
ifrs5 
Nobs: 
Tunisia: - 
France: 90 
Canada: 69 
Total: 159 
- Quality : 0.14 
(0.01) 
Opinion : 0.41 
(0.02) 
(R2 = 0.17, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.15, prob(F) = 
0.00) 
Status : t=-0.16 
(0.00) 
TD/TA : t=0.19 
(0.13) 
NI/TA : t=-0.00 
(0.92) 
CA/CL : t=0.01 
(0.21) 
Quality : t=-0.24 
(0.10) 
(R2 = 0.29, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.23, prob(F) = 
0.00) 
Quality : 0.08 
(0.11) 
Opinion : 0.44 
(0.03) 
CA/CL: 0.01 
(0.04) 
France : -0.13 
(0.00) or Canada : 
0.13 (0.00) 
(R2 = 0.21, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.19, prob(F) = 
0.00) 
ifrs6 
Nobs: 
Tunisia: - 
France: 5 
Canada: 74 
Total: 79 
- - - NLTA : -0.01 
(0.48) 
NI/TA : 0.00 
(0.99) 
Quality : 0.03 
(0.63) 
Canada : 0.36 
(0.00) or France : 
-0.36 (0.00) 
(R2 = 0.38, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.34, prob(F) = 
0.00) 
ifrs7 (nc7) 
Nobs: 
Tunisia: 50 
France: 244 
Tsales*: t=3.30 10-10 
(0.10) 
Status : t=-0.23 (0.02) 
TD/TA : t=-0.15 (0.12) 
NLTA : 0.01 (0.01) 
TD/TA : 0.02 
(0.07) 
(R2 = 0.03, 
Status : t=0.15 
(0.00) 
TD/TA : t=0.05 
(0.01) 
NLTA : 0.02 (0.00) 
Quality : 0.05 
(0.00) 
Opinion : 0.06 
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Canada: 
223 
Total: 517 
(R2 = 0.16, adjusted R2 = 
0.11, prob(F) = 0.04) 
adjusted R2 = 
0.03, prob(F) = 
0.01) 
NI/TA : t=0.00 
(0.74) 
CA/CL : t=0.00 
(0.37) 
Quality : t=0.00 
(0.90) 
(R2 = 0.46, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.45, prob(F) = 
0.00) 
(0.06) 
Canada : 0.06 
(0.00) 
(R2 = 0.20, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.19, prob(F) = 
0.00) 
ifrs8 
Nobs: 
Tunisia: - 
France: 204 
Canada: 
157 
Total: 361 
- NLTA : 0.02 (0.00) 
Opinion : -0.07 
(0.28) 
(R2 = 0.08, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.07, prob(F) = 
0.00) 
Status: t=0.33 
(0.00) 
TD/TA : t=0.16 
(0.08) 
NI/TA : t=-0.27 
(0.12) 
CA/CL : t=0.01 
(0.06) 
Quality: t=-0.11 
(0.14) 
(R2 = 0.31, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.28, prob(F) = 
0.00) 
Status : 0.21 
(0.00) 
Opinion : -0.09 
(0.31) 
TD/TA : 0.01 
(0.74) 
France : 0.07 
(0.00) or Canada : 
-0.07 (0.00) 
(R2 = 0.18, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.17, prob(F) = 
0.00) 
ifrs12 
Nobs: 
Tunisia: - 
France: 229 
Canada: 
168 
Total: 397 
- Status : 0.18 
(0.00) 
TD/TA : 0.04 
(0.33) 
(R2 = 0.25, 
adjusted R2= 0.25, 
prob(F) = 0.00) 
Status : t=0.44 
(0.00) 
TD/TA : t=0.26 
(0.04) 
NI/TA : t=-0.21 
(0.24) 
CA/CL : t=0.00 
(0.07) 
Quality : t=0.29 
(0.01) 
(R2 = 0.29, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.27, prob(F) = 
0.00) 
Status : 0.31 
(0.00) 
TD/TA : 0.12 
(0.05) 
Quality : 0.06 
(0.13) 
France : 0.12 
(0.00) or Canada : 
-0.12 (0.00) 
(R2 = 0.23, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.22, prob(F) = 
0.00) 
ifrs13 
Nobs: 
Tunisia: - 
France: 241 
Canada: 
223 
Total: 464 
- NLTA : 0.06 (0.00) 
Quality : 0.04 
(0.14) 
Opinion : -0.05 
(0.37) 
TD/TA : -0.09 
(0.10) 
(R2 = 0.45, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.44, prob(F) = 
Status : t=0.49 
(0.00) 
TD/TA : t=0.07 
(0.44) 
NI/TA : t=0.08 
(0.07) 
CA/CL : t=0.00 
(0.01) 
Quality : t=-0.01 
(0.90) 
Status : 0.44 
(0.00) 
NI/TA : 0.08 
(0.02) 
CA/CL : 0.00 
(0.00) 
Quality : 0.03 
(0.44) 
Opinion : 0.01 
(0.95) 
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0.00) (R2 = 0.30, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.29, prob(F) = 
0.00) 
France : -0.09 
(0.00) or Canada : 
0.09 (0.00) 
(R2 = 0.36, 
adjusted R2 = 
0.35, prob(F) = 
0.00) 
 
All equations presented in the table above 
are, in their majority, significant (prob (F) = 0.00). 
In addition, variables that do not exhibit significant 
coefficients are integrated into the equation to 
improve the ability of other explanatory variables. 
On 31 dependent variables and 4 sample 
categories studied, 80 robust regression equations 
were selected (prob (F) <0.05). The other 
regression equations were not presented in this 
work. 
* For Tunisian companies, we integrated 
three variables: internationalization (1 if the firm is 
listed abroad or conducts foreign sales or in which 
foreigners participate, 0 otherwise), NCL/TE (long-
term debt/Total Equity) and total sales (Tsales) 
because other variables are unable to explain the 
disclosure of the items contained in the following 
standards: NC3 and NC7 (Tsales), NC4 and NC10 
(internationalization), NC5 and NC14 (NCL/TE). 
Given the high number of inapplicable items, 
we had to integrate into the regression equations a 
variable "not applicable: Na". This variable is 
significant with a positive sign in the explanation of 
both the mandatory and voluntary disclosure. 
The size, leverage and liquidity explain 
mandatory disclosure for Tunisia (adjusted R2 = 
17%) and Canada (adjusted R2 = 25%). The size 
presents a positive sign for both countries and 
leverage and liquidity show negative signs for 
Tunisia and a positive sign for Canada. 
For voluntary disclosure, the natural 
logarithm of total assets rated 'NLTA "presents a 
positive sign for Tunisia (adjusted R2 = 17%) and 
globally (adjusted R2 = 38%) and the listing status 
presents a positive sign for France (adjusted R2 = 
3%) and Canada (adjusted R2 = 32%). The 
leverage and liquidity show negative signs for 
Tunisia. On a global scale, France and Canada 
variables have positive signs. 
For the presentation of financial statements 
(IAS1 and NC1), the audit quality has a positive 
sign for Tunisia (adjusted R2 = 4%) and the listing 
status has a negative sign for France (adjusted R2 = 
1%) and a positive sign for Canada (adjusted R2 = 
7%) and globally (adjusted R2 = 7%), France and 
Canada have negative signs. 
For the Tunisian standard on equity (NC2), 
the listing status and audit quality showed positive 
signs and the audit opinion and liquidity have 
negative signs (adjusted R2 = 15%). 
For inventories (IAS2 and NC4), the NLTA 
and internationalization show positive signs for 
Tunisia (adjusted R2 = 9%), the LNTA and audit 
quality present positive signs for France (adjusted 
R2 = 13%), the listing status presents a positive 
sign for Canada (adjusted R2 = 31%) and globally 
(adjusted R2 = 26%), the LNTA, audit quality and 
Canada show positive signs and France presents a 
negative sign. 
For cash flow (IAS7 and NC8), the NLTA 
presents a positive sign for Tunisia (adjusted R2 = 
13%) and globally (adjusted R2 = 18%) and France 
and Canada variables show negative signs. 
For change in accounting policies (IAS8 and 
NC11), the listing status has a negative sign and the 
leverage and audit opinion have a positive sign for 
France (adjusted R2 = 27%), the NLTA and audit 
quality show negative signs for Canada (adjusted 
R2 = 21%) and the listing status and France and 
Canada variables show negative signs on a global 
scale (adjusted R2 = 23%). 
For the Tunisian standard for deferred 
charges (NC10), the NLTA, audit opinion and 
internationalization have positive signs and the 
listing status has a negative sign in the presence of 
NLTA but brings an additional contribution 
(adjusted R2 = 31%). 
For events after the balance sheet date 
(IAS10 and NC14), the listing status and leverage 
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have negative signs for Tunisia (adjusted R2 = 
11%), the listing status and audit opinion have 
negative signs for France (adjusted R2 = 60%), the 
listing status and audit quality have negative signs 
and the leverage presents a positive sign for 
Canada (adjusted R2 = 28%) and globally 
(adjusted R2 = 42%), the listing status has a 
negative sign and France and Canada variables 
have positive signs. 
For construction contracts (IAS11 and NC9), 
the liquidity has a positive sign for France 
(adjusted R2 = 21%), the leverage has a positive 
sign for Canada (adjusted R2 = 18%) and globally 
(adjusted R2 = 39%), the liquidity and leverage 
have a positive sign. 
For income taxes (IAS12), the listing status 
presents a positive sign for France (adjusted R2 = 
35%), Canada (adjusted R2 = 56%) and globally 
(adjusted R2 = 57%), next to the listing status, 
France has a negative sign and Canada presents a 
positive sign. 
For tangible assets (IAS16 and NC5), the 
listing status and leverage have negative signs for 
Tunisia (adjusted R2 = 16%), the listing status has 
a negative sign for France (adjusted R2 = 19%) and 
on a global scale (adjusted R2 = 53%), the listing 
status and Tunisia have negative signs. 
For leases (IAS17 and NC41), the NLTA 
presents a positive sign for France (adjusted R2 = 
6%), the leverage and audit quality have negative 
signs for Canada (adjusted R2 = 7%) and on global 
scale (adjusted R2 = 5%), the LNTA presents a 
positive sign and France has a negative sign. 
For revenue (IAS18 and NC3), the NLTA and 
audit quality showed positive signs for France 
(adjusted R2 = 18%) and globally (adjusted R2 = 
39%). On a global scale, France has a negative sign. 
For employee benefits (IAS19), the LNTA 
and audit quality showed positive signs for France 
(adjusted R2 = 18%) and globally (adjusted R2 = 
39%). France has a negative sign on a global scale. 
For government grants (IAS20 and NC12), 
the NLTA and performance have negative signs and 
the liquidity has a positive sign for France 
(adjusted R2 = 36%), the listing status has a sign 
negative for Canada (adjusted R2 = 42%) and the 
listing status and performance have negative signs 
on a global scale (adjusted R2 = 27%). 
For the effects of changes in foreign 
exchange rates (IAS21 and NC15), the audit quality 
and audit opinion have negative signs for Tunisia 
(adjusted R2 = 7%), the listing status has a 
negative sign for France (adjusted R2 = 2%) and 
the audit quality, audit opinion and Tunisia have 
negative signs on a global scale (adjusted R2 = 
85%). 
For borrowing costs (IAS23 and NC13), the 
NLTA presents a positive sign and France presents 
a negative sign on a global scale (adjusted R2 = 
35%). 
For information on related parties (IAS24 
and NC39), the NLTA and audit opinion showed 
positive signs for France (adjusted R2 = 6%), the 
listing status and liquidity for Canada (adjusted R2 
= 12%), the listing status and Tunisia and France 
variables and negative sign for Canada variable 
globally (adjusted R2 = 18%). 
For earnings per share (IAS33), the listing 
status has a negative sign for France (adjusted R2 = 
4%) and globally (adjusted R2 = 2%). 
For impairment of assets (IAS36), the NLTA 
and audit quality showed positive signs for France 
(adjusted R2 = 3%), the listing status presents a 
positive sign for Canada (adjusted R2 = 28%) and 
the listing status and France have positive signs 
and the liquidity has negative sign globally 
(adjusted R2 = 23%). 
For provisions, contingent liabilities and 
contingent assets (IAS37), the listing status 
presents a positive sign for France (adjusted R2 = 
9%), Canada (adjusted R2 = 40%) and globally 
(adjusted R2 = 22%). 
For intangible assets (IAS38 and NC6), the 
audit quality and audit opinion have negative signs 
for Tunisia (adjusted R2 = 11%), the listing status 
presents a positive sign for Canada (adjusted R2 = 
30%) and a positive signal on the global scale 
(adjusted R2 = 17%). The audit opinion and 
Canada have negative signs globally. 
For share-based payment (IFRS2), the NLTA 
presents a negative sign for France (adjusted R2 = 
5%), the listing status has a negative sign for 
Canada (adjusted R2 = 21%) and globally 
(adjusted R2 = 24%) and the audit quality and 
Canada show positive signs. 
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For business combinations (IFRS3 and 
NC38), the NLTA presents a positive sign for 
France (adjusted R2 = 22%), the listing status has a 
positive sign for Canada (adjusted R2 = 54%) and 
globally (adjusted R2 = 56%) and Tunisia and 
Canada show positive signs globally. 
For non-current assets held for sale and 
discontinued operations (IFRS5), the audit quality 
and audit opinion showed positive signs for France 
(adjusted R2 = 15%), the listing status and audit 
quality (significant coefficient at 10%) have 
negative signs for Canada (adjusted R2 = 23%), the 
audit opinion, liquidity and Canada show positive 
signs and France has a negative sign on overall 
scale (adjusted R2 = 19%). 
For the exploration for and evaluation of 
mineral resources (IFRS6), Canada has a positive 
sign and France a negative sign globally (adjusted 
R2 = 34%). 
For financial instruments (IFRS7 and NC7), 
the total sales shows a positive sign for Tunisia 
(adjusted R2 = 11%), the leverage and NLTA show 
positive signs for France (adjusted R2 = 3%), the 
listing status and leverage have positive signs for 
Canada (adjusted R2 = 45%) and the NLTA, audit 
quality, audit opinion and Canada show positive 
signs globally (adjusted R2 = 19%). 
For the operating segments (IFRS8), the 
NLTA presents a positive sign for France (adjusted 
R2 = 7%), the listing status, leverage and liquidity 
(t significant at 6%) have positive signs for Canada 
(adjusted R2 = 28%), the listing status and France 
showed positive signs and Canada has a negative 
sign on the global scale (adjusted R2 = 17%). 
For disclosure of interests in other entities 
(IFRS12), the listing status presents a positive sign 
for France (adjusted R2 = 25%), the listing status, 
leverage, liquidity and audit quality showed 
positive signs for Canada (adjusted R2 = 27%), the 
listing status, leverage and France showed positive 
signs and Canada has a negative sign on the global 
scale (adjusted R2 = 22%). 
For the fair value measurement (IFRS13), 
the NLTA presents a positive sign and leverage a 
negative sign for France (adjusted R2 = 44%), the 
listing status and liquidity have positive signs and 
the performance has a negative sign for Canada 
(adjusted R2 = 29%), the listing status, 
performance, liquidity and Canada have positive 
signs and France has a negative sign globally 
(adjusted R2 = 35%). 
Variables are predominant in the 
explanation of disclosure: on 80 equations 
presented, the audit quality is in 53 equations, the 
listing status is in 51; the leverage and liquidity are 
in 37 equations, the audit opinion is in 34 
equations, the natural logarithm of total assets is in 
29 equations and nationality proxies of France and 
Canada are in 26 equations. The nationality proxy 
of Tunisia is in 8 equations. 
Table 10 shows the significant independent 
variables in explaining the disclosure of IAS/IFRS 
information. 
 
Table 10. Order of importance of the independent variables 
Independent 
variable  
Dependent Variables (sign) 
 Tunisian 
sample 
French sample Canadian sample Overall sample 
Listing status nc2 (+), nc14 
(-),  
nc7 (-) 
Voluntary 
disclosure (+), 
ias1 (-), ias8 (-), 
ias10 (-), ias12 (-), 
ias18 (+), ias21 (-
), ias37 (+), ifrs12 
(+) 
Voluntary disclosure (+), 
ias1 (+), ias2 (+), ias10 
(-), ias12 (+), ias18 (+), 
ias20 (+), ias24 (+), 
ias33 (+), ias36 (+), 
ias37  (+), ias38 (+), 
ifrs2 (-), ifrs3 (+), ifrs5 
(-), ifrs7 (+), ifrs8 (+), 
ifrs12 (+), ifrs13 (+) 
ias2 (+), ias8 (-), ias10 
(-), ias12 (+), ias20 (-), 
ias21 (+), ias24 (+), 
ias33 (+), ias36 (+), 
ias37 (+), ias38 (+), 
ifrs 2 (-), ifrs3 (+), ifrs8 
(+), ifrs13 (+) 
Subtotal 1(+) + 2(-) 4(+) + 5(-) = 9 15 (+) + 3(-) = 18 11(+) + 3(-) = 14 
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= 3 
Total 31(+) + 13(-) = 44 
Size (NLTA) Mandatory 
disclosure 
(+) 
Voluntary 
disclosure 
(+), 
nc4 (+) 
nc10 (+) 
 
ias2 (+), ias7 (+), 
ias17 (+), ias19 
(+), ias20 (-), 
ias24 (+), ias33 
(+), ias36 (+), 
ifrs2 (-), ifrs3 (+), 
ifrs7 (+), ifrs8 
(+), ifrs13 (+) 
Mandatory disclosure 
(+) 
ias8 (+) 
Voluntary disclosure 
(+), ias7 (+), ias17 
(+), ias19 (+), ias23 
(+), ifrs7 (+) 
 
subtotal 4 (+) 11(+) + 2(-) = 13 2 (+) 6 (+) 
Total 23 (+) + 2 (-) = 25 
France    Voluntary disclosure 
(+), ias1 (-), ias2 (-), 
ias7 (-), ias8 (-), ias10 
(+), ias11 (-), ias12 (-), 
ias17 (-), ias18 (+), 
ias19 (-), ias23 (-), 
ias24 (+), ias36 (+), 
ifrs5 (-), ifrs6 (-), ifrs8 
(+), ifrs12 (+), ifrs13 (-
) 
Total - 7(+) + 12(-) = 19 
Canada    Voluntary disclosure 
(+), ias1 (-), ias2 (+), 
ias7 (-), ias11 (+), 
ias12 (+), ias18 (+), 
ias24 (-), ias38 (-), ifrs3 
(+), ifrs5 (+), ifrs6 (+), 
ifrs7 (+), ifrs8 (+), 
ifrs12 (-), ifrs13 (+) 
Total - 11(+) + 5(-) = 16 
Liquidity Mandatory 
disclosure  
(-), voluntary 
disclosure  (-
),  
ias11 (+), ias20 
(+) 
Mandatory disclosure 
(+), ias10 (+), ias24 (+), 
ifrs8 (+), ifrs13 (+),  
ias11 (+), ias20 (+), 
ias33 (+), ias36 (-), 
ifrs5 (+), ifrs13 (+) 
Subtotal 2(-) 2(+) 5(+) 5(+) + 1(-) = 6 
Total 12(+) + 3(-) = 15 
Audit quality  ias1 (+), nc2 
(+), ias38 (-) 
ias19 (+), ias33 
(+), ias36 (+), 
ifrs5 (+) 
ias8 (+), ias17 (-),  ias2 (+), ias19 (+), 
ias21 (-), ifrs2 (+), 
ifrs7 (+) 
Subtotal 2(+) + 1(-) 
=3 
4(+) 1(+) + 1(-) = 2 4(+) + 1(-) = 5 
Total 11(+) + 3(-) = 14 
Leverage  Mandatory ias8 (+), ifrs7 (+), ias11 (+), ias17 (-), ifrs7 ias11 (+), ifrs12 (+) 
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disclosure   (-
), voluntary 
disclosure (-
),  
ifrs13 (-) (+), ifrs8 (+), ifrs12 (+),  
Sous-total 2(-) 2(+) + 1(-) = 3 4(+) + 1 (-) = 5 2(+) 
Total 8(+) + 4 (-) = 12 
Opinion 
d’audit 
nc10 (+), 
ias18 (-), 
ias21 (-), 
ias38 (-) 
ias8 (+), ias24 
(+), ifrs5 (+) 
 ias21 (-), ias38 (-), ifrs5 
(+), ifrs7 (+) 
Subtotal 1(+) + 3(-) 
= 4 
3(+)  2(-) + 2(+) = 4 
Total 6(+) + 5(-) = 11 
Performance  Ias20 (-) Ias18 (+), ifrs13 (+) Ias18 (+), Ias20 (-), 
ifrs13 (+) 
Subtotal - 1(-) 2(+) 2(+) + 1(-) = 3 
Total 4(+) + 2(-) = 6 
Tunisia    Ias10 (+), ias11 (-), 
ias21 (-), ias24 (+), 
ifrs13 (+) 
Total  - 3(+) + 2(-) = 5 
 
The listing status is the dominant variable in 
explaining the disclosure of IAS/IFRS information. 
For Canadian companies, the listing status has 
many positive signs in relations with other 
countries (15 positive signs against 3 negative 
signs). It has a positive effect on the disclosure of 
the items contained in NC2 (equity), IAS1, IAS2, 
IAS18, IAS20, IAS24, IAS33, IAS36, IAS37, IAS38, 
IFRS3, IFRS7, IFRS8, IFRS12 and IFRS13. 
The size measured by the natural logarithm 
of total assets positively affects the disclosure of 
the items contained in IAS2, IAS7, IAS8, NC10 
(deferred charges), IAS17, IAS19, IAS23, IAS24, 
IAS33, IAS36, IFRS3, IFRS7, IFRS8 and IFRS13. 
The nationality proxy “France” has many 
negative signs (12 (-) against 7 (+)) and negatively 
affects disclosure items contained in IAS1, IAS2, 
IAS7, IAS8, IAS11, IAS12, IAS17, IAS19, IAS23, 
IFRS5, IFRS6 and IFRS13. 
The nationality proxy “Canada” has many 
positive signs (11 (+) against 5 (-)) and positively 
affects the disclosure items contained in IAS2, 
IAS11, IAS12, IAS18, IFRS3, IFRS5, IFRS6, IFRS7 
and IFRS13. 
The liquidity has many positive signs (12 
(+) against 3 (-)) and has a positive effect on the 
disclosure of the items contained in IAS10, IAS11, 
IAS20, IAS24, IAS33, IFRS5, IFRS8 and IFRS13. 
The audit quality has many positive signs 
(11 (+) against 3 (-)) and has a positive effect on 
the disclosure of the items contained in IAS1, NC2 
(equity), IAS2, IAS8, IAS19, IAS33, IAS36, IFRS2, 
IFRS7 and IFRS5. 
The leverage has many positive signs (8 (+) 
against 4 (-)) and has a positive effect on the 
disclosure of the items contained in IAS8, IAS11, 
IFRS7, IFRS8 and IFRS12. 
The audit opinion has three positive signs 
for the French sample and positively affects the 
disclosure of the items contained in IAS8, IAS24 
and IFRS5. For the Tunisian sample, the audit 
opinion presents more negative signs (3 (+) 
against 1 (-)) and has a negative effect on the 
disclosure of the items contained in IAS18, IAS21 
and IAS38. 
The performance presents many positive 
signs (4 (+)against 2 (-)) and has a positive effect 
on the disclosure of the items contained in IAS18 
and IFRS13 for Canadian companies and has a 
negative effect on the disclosure of the items 
contained in IAS20 for French companies.  
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The nationality proxy “Tunisia” positively 
affects the disclosure of the items contained in 
IAS10 (NC14) and IAS24 (NC39) and has a 
negative effect on the disclosure of the items 
contained in IAS11 and IAS21.Table 11 presents 
hypotheses, the meaning of the sign of the effect of 
the independent variable and the results found. 
 
Table 11. Results of validated hypotheses  
Hypothesis Sign Result 
H1: the size of the firm has a positive effect on the disclosure of information. + confirmed 
H2: the performance of the firm has a positive effect on the disclosure of information. + confirmed 
H3: the leverage has a positive effect on the disclosure of information. + confirmed 
H4: the listing status has a positive effect on the disclosure of information. + confirmed 
H5: the audit opinion has an effect on the disclosure of information. +/- confirmed 
H6: the audit quality has a positive effect on the disclosure of information. + confirmed 
H7: the liquidity has a positive effect on the disclosure of information. + confirmed 
H8: the country of nationality of the firm has an effect on the disclosure of information. +/- confirmed 
 
All independent variables have an effect on 
the disclosure of IAS/IFRS information. When the 
sign direction of the effect is mostly positive, the 
direction is marked (+). For the variable country, 
the meaning of the sign varies by country. 
Therefore, there is no strong sense. 
Although the explanatory power of firm 
characteristics is high since adjusted R2 could reach 
85%, these characteristics can not by themselves 
explain the disclosure of informtion. Indeed, 
financial communication is a strategic and complex 
decision from those charged with governance. (The 
Bruslerie and Gabteni, 2014) 
Therefore, next to the firm characteristics, 
this work can be extended to the study of the effect 
of governance mechanisms on disclosure of 
IAS/IFRS information. Recently, Ebrahim and 
Fattah (2015) showed the positive effect of 
institutional ownership, foreign representation in 
the boards and audit quality on disclosure of 
information. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
We studied the effect of firm characteristics 
on the disclosure of IAS/IFRS information. The 
disclosure may be mandatory, voluntary or 
elementary (disclosure of the items contained in 
each standard). The dependent variable can be 
mandatory disclosure, voluntary disclosure or 
disclosure of individual items contained in the 
accounting standards. The independent variables 
are the size, performance, leverage, liquidity, listing 
status, audit quality, audit opinion and nationality 
of the firm (country). We have integrated a 
variable linked to the national context to show that 
the characteristics of the firm alone can not explain 
the disclosure of IAS/IFRS information but there is 
a factor of the external environment to the firm 
that can explain this disclosure. 
We found that mandatory, voluntary or 
elementary disclosure is affected by the 
characteristics of the firm. The majority of 
dependent variables are influenced by firm 
characteristics that do not have the same 
importance. The characteristics of the firm are 
ranked in order of importance as follows: listing 
status, natural logarithm of total assets, nationality 
proxy “France”, nationality proxy “Canada”, 
liquidity, audit quality, leverage, audit opinion, 
performance and nationality proxy “Tunisia”. The 
hypotheses of the study are confirmed. The 
direction of the effect of the characteristics of the 
firm on the disclosure of IAS/IFRS information is 
found in the majority of the selected regression 
equations. 
In addition to the characteristics of the 
company, other variables may explain the 
disclosure of IAS/IFRS information as governance 
mechanisms. Alencar and Lopes (2010) consider 
that financial reporting practices depend on firms’ 
incentives to provide informative data rather than 
standards and regulations. 
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Governance mechanisms influence the 
disclosure of IAS/IFRS information, such as the 
institutional ownership and foreign representation 
in the boards (Ebrahim and Fattah, 2015) or 
voluntary disclosure such as the percentage of 
block share ownership with more than 10 % of the 
capital and  percentage of managerial share 
(Adelopo, 2011). 
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